Key questions and issues raised during the public meetings
22 December 2006
This section provides responses to questions and issues that were raised in many of the Shared Fisheries public meetings held in November and December 2006.
The questions and answers are grouped into the following areas:
We are also working on material related to values and valuation which will be completed early in January.
“Proportionalism”
Is it true that the Shared Fisheries proposals are “all about proportionalism”?
The answer to this question is no. ‘Proportionalism’ is a label that refers to making an allocation to the amateur sector of a fixed ‘share’ in the Total Allowable Catch of each fish stock. It implies that the amateur sector would be locked in to the share, without any possibility of adjustment in the future. The Shared Fisheries proposals have been portrayed by some stakeholders as “all about proportionalism.”
There are two options in the Shared Fisheries proposals that relate to proportional adjustments to allocations. These are Options A and C in Section 5.2 (see next question and answer). Neither provides for a simple percentage share allocation without the possibility of adjustment in the future. Proportional adjustments have the benefit of predictable outcomes, giving increased certainty to both sectors as well as creating incentives for both groups to work together to conserve and enhance fisheries.
All of the other Shared Fisheries proposals are either options for allocating catch or access in other ways, or are unrelated to the allocation of the Total Allowable Catch.
Key proposals that are unrelated to allocation of shares include the ability to manage fisheries with a focus on increased abundance (this would mean more and bigger fish in the water) and the ability to rebuild depleted fisheries more quickly (see Section 3). Both of these proposals would give greater recognition to non-commercial values when setting the Total Allowable Catch. Another proposal suggests the ability to use local area management to resolve competition between sectors.
A third major proposal suggests that an independent Amateur Fishing Trust be set up to work on behalf of existing amateur fishing organisations, representing their views in fisheries management processes and promoting the development of an ongoing, representative amateur fishing organisation. Establishment funding for the trust would come from government.
What are “proportional adjustments to allocations” then?
Section 5.2 of the Shared Fisheries discussion document proposes some options for ongoing adjustments to amateur and commercial allocations:
- Option A is proportional adjustments. What this would mean is that, when a change is made to the Total Allowable Catch for a stock, the change would be shared between the two sectors in proportion to their current allocations. So, if there were a 10% increase in the amount of the TAC available for sharing between commercial and amateur sectors, then each would get 10% more than they had already. Option A also includes the possibility of proportionality being subject to agreed rules on apportioning changes. This would allow for the possibility of attributing changes in the TAC to the behaviour of a sector group. This could include taking into account specific conservation actions adopted by a sector when allocating any TAC increase. It may also be possible to attribute TAC decreases in cases where damaging behaviour outside agreed rules was identified and attributable to a particular sector.
- Option B (value-based adjustments) allows for non-proportional allocation. Where an adjustment to the baseline allocation is needed, an assessment of value would be used to inform decisions about which sector should receive the gain (or, alternatively, bear the loss). The assessment allows for issues such as population growth, changes in participation rate, and changes in commercial opportunities to be reflected in changes in value. This would allow the movement of allocations towards increased overall value.
- Option C proposes a scheme that would combine a proportional approach as the default, but if valuation information suggested allocations were significantly out of balance changes would be made to the shares of each sector.
Consideration of redress to the commercial sector could arise with options B and C if adjustments resulted in reallocation from the commercial sector to the amateur sector.
The Shared Fisheries proposals include providing for ongoing adjustments to be determined through agreements included in fisheries plans. Alternative options may also be identified through the consultation process or by submitters.
Baseline allocations
To develop an allocation framework that provides more certainty to all users, we need to confirm a ‘place to start’. This is the idea behind establishing baseline allocations. From the baseline allocation, the allocation framework can then provide for ongoing adjustments as necessary.
Section 5.1 of the Shared Fisheries discussion document suggests that baseline allocations be set by:
- rolling over existing allowances, or
- adopting an allocation agreed between the amateur and commercial sectors in a fisheries plan, or
- in a limited number of stocks, providing for a structured process to re-set existing allowances (section 5.1 describes three options for this process).
This set of questions and answers provides some more information on these particular proposals.
Why are baseline allocations so important?
Under a more certain allocation framework, the conditions under which changes could be made to allocations would be better specified. This means the specified conditions would need to be met before a change was made, and so where we start from (the baseline allocation) becomes more important than it is now. The importance of baselines depends on what option is chosen for ongoing adjustments. If the ongoing regime is proportional, the baselines are particularly important.
The Shared Fisheries proposals also include options for ongoing adjustments to be based on value or to be based on a combination of value and proportionality. Consideration of value means that where factors such as population growth, changes in participation, or changes in commercial opportunities lead to significant changes in values, existing shares could be adjusted to reflect the changes in value. In such circumstances the costs imposed by future adjustments would need to be recognised.
If the new framework for ongoing adjustments includes adjusting shares to increase overall value, what the baselines are at the beginning is less important because shares can be adjusted as factors change and new information becomes available.
Why is a process being suggested for re-setting existing allowances?
The key reason for providing for existing allowances to be re-set is because the amateur sector has expressed the view that some of these allowances would be inappropriate if used as shares under a new and more certain allocation framework for ongoing adjustments. For instance, the effect of past management decisions may be viewed as having lead to amateur allocations that are not reasonable as baselines. Therefore, the discussion document includes options for a process to examine a limited number of stocks. Moving from the existing situation to a ‘new’ baseline allocation may involve an adjustment period, including the possibility of moving the stock to a different level of biomass.
Why is the number of stocks limited to only a small number of shared stocks?
The reasons for this are mainly practical. The types of processes suggested would be costly—in terms of operating the preferred re-setting process, obtaining any necessary background information, and providing for any redress to the commercial sector.
What happens to the stocks that are not included in the short list for resetting?
The document proposes that baseline allocations for other stocks could be set based on existing allowances or based on a set of rules agreed as part of a Fisheries Plan.
Issues that arise with respect to this suggestion are:
- A number of important shared fisheries (including blue cod, häpuka, grey mullet, and a number of stocks in paua and tarakihi) do not have explicit allowances.
- For some fisheries the Total Allowable Catch is set based on models that are independent of amateur catch information. As information on amateur catch is obtained, the actual catch might be able to be allowed for without affecting sustainability. There is no reason to lock in an assumed catch if the actual catch is not affecting sustainability or the existing harvesting rights of other sectors.
These are important issues which will require further policy development. Suggestions and comment from stakeholders on how the different scenarios could be dealt with are welcomed. A workable approach should be able to take into account emerging information on amateur catch, acknowledge any trends, and ensure sustainability. The objective is to establish a reasonable baseline from which to move toward certainty over allocation and increases in value.
Who gets to choose which stocks would be included in the short list?
The discussion document asks for suggestions in submissions on the highest priority stocks to consider for the re-setting process. The final decision on whether to proceed with this option, and which stocks may be considered will be taken by the Minister of Fisheries in consultation with his Cabinet colleagues.
Submitters may wish to identify criteria (rather than stocks) that would guide the selection of fisheries for the re-setting process.
Illegal fishing and sustainability concerns
Why does the Shared Fisheries project not deal with illegal fishing? What is happening to control illegal fishing?
The Shared Fisheries project focuses on the objective of increasing the value obtained from the use of shared fisheries resources, within the existing framework of legal rules.
Illegal fishing can have a serious impact on the values that are able to be obtained from the legitimate use of fisheries. While compliance with fisheries laws is critical to protect our fisheries, the Shared Fisheries project is not designed to address these issues and does not contain any additional proposals to control illegal fishing.
However, the Ministry of Fisheries maintains a substantial compliance capability with an emphasis on:
- promoting voluntary compliance with fisheries laws; and
- creating an effective deterrent against illegal activity.
A number of programmes are in place to help achieve fisheries compliance. These include engaging with stakeholders on compliance issues; effective communication of fisheries rules; monitoring and surveillance, especially in high risk fisheries; and prosecuting offenders. Education including the provision of information encourages fishers to keep within limits.
The 0800 4 Poacher hotline and the recently launched Poaching is Theft are important initiatives to address illegal fishing.
See - Poaching is Theft - Press Release
Why does the Shared Fisheries project not deal with measures to ensure sustainability?
The Shared Fisheries project focuses on the objective of increasing the value obtained from the use of shared fisheries resources, within the existing framework of rules and measures to set sustainable catch limits and protect the environment.
There is no doubt that fishing can have an impact on the environment and that this, in turn, impacts on the values that can be obtained from shared fisheries. In addition, there are a number of other activities, especially land-based activities, which can affect fisheries resources. Responsibility to manage such adverse effects generally resides with local government and is outside the scope of the Shared Fisheries project.
The Ministry of Fisheries has a number of programmes in place to ensure that fishing is sustainable. These are not part of the Shared Fisheries project, but are ongoing processes that ensure that fishing is environmentally sustainable.
Foremost among the programmes is the investment made in stock assessment research. The purpose of this work is to provide information to support decisions on total catch limits. These catch limits ensure that fish can be harvested on a sustainable basis year after year. Work is also underway to improve the environmental performance of fisheries through establishing standards and developing fisheries plans that meet the standards. The aim is to give stakeholders incentives to develop innovative ways to meet the standards. For example, catching fish may lead to the incidental capture of seabirds or disturbance to life on the seafloor. In each case, effective management requires incentives for fishers to modify their fishing activities to stay within the limits set for levels of effect on the environment. Where incentives require backup, more direct measures can be taken such as fishery closures or gear restrictions.
The Ministry of Fisheries website holds additional information on fisheries and environmental matters. Useful pages include:
Effect of Shared Fisheries proposals on existing agreements
The current management of many shared fisheries is underpinned by agreements that have been reached between the amateur and commercial sectors. In the main, these involve concessions from the commercial sector not to fish in certain areas or not to use specified methods at particular times, in order to improve amateur access to fisheries.
Agreements are typically implemented in a way that best fits in with the circumstances of a fishery. In some instances, historical agreements have been implemented through regulations and are supported by a high level of buy-in from the commercial sector. In other instances agreements are given effect through voluntary, and sometimes contractual, arrangements.
Where there is a need for agreements to have a more formal status, they can be incorporated into the fisheries plan process. Fisheries plans are approved by the Minister of Fisheries, and there is potential for agreements to be incorporated into the regulatory framework in order to strengthen their status.
Will the Shared Fisheries proposals undermine existing processes and agreements that are already in place?
The Shared Fisheries proposals are all about improving the value that New Zealanders get from the sustainable use of shared fisheries. The policy looks to build on the progress that has been made through the different sectors working together, but it also provides for situations where agreements have been hard or impossible to reach. There are a number of ways in which the two approaches might work together.
At the stock level
Where value-based agreements are reached about the management target and allocation of the available catch (that is, the TAC and TACC) they will generally require Ministerial approval to implement. This is probably best achieved though a fisheries plan and is one of the approaches to set baseline allocations suggested in the Shared Fisheries proposals.
The same approach may lead to agreements over how to implement ongoing adjustments to the allocations as stocks increase or decrease in size relative to the target biomass.
At a local level
The Shared Fisheries proposals contain two local area management proposals that could complement agreement-based approaches.
The first is to give support to sector-initiated proposals that may require some strengthening in order to be effective. This could come through incorporation into the regulatory framework to avoid the impact of ‘free-riders’ who may not otherwise abide by agreements.
The second is to take fisheries plans to a local scale and for agreements to be sanctioned by the Minister of Fisheries as part of approving the plan.
While management at a local scale can often deliver benefits, if it is achieved through government intervention it will require considerable resources to implement. The costs associated with local management will always be an important consideration.
Will redress be made on a willing buyer/willing seller basis?
In the event of an explicit reallocation of the TAC from the commercial sector to the amateur sector, redress would require compensation for removal of quota rights. In principle this should be achieved through willing buyer/willing seller mechanisms such as purchase of quota on the open market or through tender procedures.
The redress should reflect the opportunity cost of the reallocation. Ideally this would be measured by quota value in competitive quota markets. However the Government must also consider, and minimise, the financial costs to the taxpayer. In determining an appropriate mechanism to give effect to compensation, the government is likely to need to consider a range of specific circumstances that may distort quota markets, such as thin markets, concentration of ownership, and sale restrictions.
Redress for adjustment costs due to changes in local area management are not likely to be amenable to a willing buyer/willing seller basis since quota is not tied to local areas. However, the same general approach should apply: redress should reflect the opportunity cost of any decision to change management to favour the amateur sector interests